The weightiest of the arguments against God’s existence is the problem of evil. There are many different responses to the problem of evil. None of them is entirely satisfactory alone but together they do cast doubt on whether the existence of evil disproves the claim that God exists. In brief, the problem is this: The traditional conception of God is as omniscient (all-knowing), omnipotent (all-powerful), and omnibenevolent. This implies that if God exists then he knows how to, wants to and is able to prevent all suffering. If such a God existed, though, then he actually would prevent all suffering. Suffering, however, is a familiar part of the world around us; it has not been prevented. There is, therefore, no omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent God. One of the best responses to the problem of evil is, I believe, the free-will defence which I will try to defend from a logical point of view.

When referring to the problem of evil, we need to take into account the fact that some religions think of the world as a battleground between the forces of good and the forces of evil. In some religions individuals are invited to think of themselves as having a role to play in determining the outcome of this cosmic war. But in other religions, God is conceived as omnipotent as well as wholly good and so the victory of good over evil is assured. Indeed for Christians, this victory has been assured since the beginning of time. However, evil is not a logical problem for all religious systems. According to the Vedanta teachings of Hinduism evil is an illusion. It is always possible in this way to adopt the radical solution of denying the existence of evil. But within the western context and the Christian world that we live in it is impossible to consider a world containing only good and no evil. It seems to imply a contradiction.

According to the orthodox Christian thought the problem of evil appears from a set of beliefs that seem inconsistent. These can be set within the following seven premises:

Premise 1: God is exists and is wholly good and omnipotent;

Premise 2: God being all good cannot do evil;

Premise 3: God as omnipotent can prevent the existence of evil;

Premise 4: evil exists;

Premise 5: God is omniscient

Premise 6: If evil exists, it is because God did not want to prevent it or could not prevent or foresee.

Premise 7: Therefore, God cannot be understood as being both omnipotent, wholly good and capable of knowing everything.

So God is wholly good and omnipotent but cannot be understood as being both omnipotent and wholly good because He cannot prevent evil or decides not to. Of course the inconsistency is there because God is thought to be wholly good. Premise 6 denies premises (1), (2), (3) and (5). But some theologians and philosophers have sought to retain Premises 1-5 and avoid the inconsistency by claiming that God has purposes which justify allowing evil even though He can prevent it. But there are no easy solutions for those who accept Premises 1-5. There is a further problem with Premise 5, namely that God is omniscient. If God knows everything, could He then not be able to avoid some evils? Once again if He knows but refuses to, implies that God might not be wholly good, or maybe there is some evil that God does not know because evil is caused by human action and not by God’s decision. Even if some evil or all evil is not willed by God, why does He not prevent it? Is He really omnipotent, wholly good and omniscient? If all this three components of God disappear, so does the idea of God. There is a way out as many theologians (mainly the theodicists) have denied Premises 6-7. If God does allow evil, it’s because they say evil is necessary if God is to achieve the good purposes He has for the universe as a whole.

The denial of Premises 6-7 have been mainly represented by the leading response to the problem of evil, the free-will defence argued by the theodicists. It has been argued that God’s purposes for humankind could not be achieved without allowing humans free will. In the same line of argument we could add that our lives without free will would be that of automata. God had to give us free will, so that we are not mere puppets. Now free will is the freedom to choose either good or evil. God does not will the evil that people choose to do. His will is that they should freely choose the good. Therefore, God is no way responsible for the evil that there is. In this line of argument we can reflect on Aquinas for what he meant that all evil arises as a byproduct of some desired good. According to Aquinas, it is possible to eliminate the logical problem of evil, because in fact that problem does not seem to exist. In his line of thought it is possible to conceive God as the accidental cause of some physical evils without assigning moral culpability to Him for the existence of such evil.[1] Evils are themselves byproducts of the humans exercise of free-will. We cannot forget that for Christians our souls are trapped inside finite bodies. Consequently, soul and body are in a constant conflict of interests, because the body requires different desires. So many times we decide to choose what is wrong just because of our physical needs. But Aquinas does not explain why natural evils which are independent of human action still exist. In a perfect world we would not have natural catastrophes like hurricanes and draught, or would we?

In his Theodicy, Leibniz tries to give us answers to the problem of evil and in particular, natural evil. This problem can be simplified into one single question, if God has the power to create any possible world, why did He not create the very best possible world? As Aquinas believed, that the very best possible world had to have free will, and evil was necessary, so that we could have the power to choose. Leibniz agrees and points out that if God is perfect He must have created a world possessing the optimum balance of good and evil. Besides, some goods are made possible only by the presence of evil – for instance, courage is made possible by the existence of fear or danger. What distinguishes Leibniz’s view from Aquinas is that Leibniz conceives his theodicy as a defence of God’s justice. God had to balance the total value of all possible worlds and create the one in which evil contributes to its being the best of all possible worlds.

I must admit that there is a feeling of “optimality” in consideration of the world that God would have actually created. Why should it not be possible to claim that the best possible world might contain no unhappiness at all? If God is omnipotent then why did he have to choose? Why is God limited in finding a better world? A theodicist can claim that if there was less moral and natural evil, there would be less equally good. The world would contain less meaning for us, things would be easier but not so good, because easier does not necessarily means good. There are a number of character traits that are valuable only if evil exists. Compassion, for instance, is of great value, but can only exist if there is suffering. Bravery, too, is a virtue, but only if we sometimes face danger. It would be seem easier for a mother to deny her child suffering but that would not be good but evil.According to Augustine, free will is a necessary condition of human personhood, a condition which subsequently underwrites our views on such notions as responsibility and accountability. By giving humans free-will and placing them in a world in which evil choices are always possible, God brought it about that he is not responsible for the moral evil in the world. It is a direct consequence of human intentions realized in acts and omissions.

Augustine’s argument seems to give us a response, but once again he falls into a positivism or “optimality”. In fact all theodicies fall for the biblical claim that ^“For everything in the world—the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life—comes not from the Father but from the world” (1 john 2:16). Well if God created the World but is not responsible for its sins, then humans are, but the problem is that same sinful men are also a creation of God. It seems that the Bible does not want to charge God for any evil that exists in the world (maybe because Christian believe the bible is actually God’s word). All the existing problems are man’s fault, but as I said before many moral evils are initially caused by natural evils, which are not dependent in human moral action, but rather on God’s creative powers. Plantinga observes, “The theist observes that God has a reason for permitting evil; he doesn’t know what that reason is. But why should that mean that his belief is improper or irrational?” But why should we play God’s devil advocate and defend him from any evil that this world might contain? If a world in which everyone has significant freedom but never chooses wrong actions is conceivable, then why didn’t God create that world? It does not seem logical to think that if God is omnipotent, omniscient and all good he should have created a world in which humans tended to choose what is right rather than what is wrong? Plantinga shows that “it is not within God’s power (as an omnipotent being) to create a world containing moral good without creating one containing moral evil”[2]. Hence, moral evil must exist, since God has created a world with moral good. “Does the Theist contradict himself?” In response, Plantinga presents John Mackie’s claim that theist doctrines are inconsistent. Plantinga explores Mackie’s claim and explains the different types of contradictions there can be.

Alvin Plantinga

Plantinga argues that Mackie’s claim proposition “God is omnipotent, omniscient, and all-good” entails the proposition “God creates no persons who perform morally wrong actions”[3] can be denied. Mackie and Flew argue as follows: Since God is omnipotent, he could create any person he chooses. Since God is omniscient, he would know, before creating a given person, whether that person will perform morally wrong or morally right actions. And if God is all-good, he would create only those persons who (he knows in advance) will perform only right actions. If this claim is correct, then traditional theism is in trouble. Theism holds that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and all-good, and it also holds that God created every person who exists. However, Plantinga contends that the argument against the existence of God offered by Mackie is wrong because the statement “God is omnipotent, omniscient, and all-good” does not entail “God creates no person who performs a morally wrong action.”According to Plantinga, to strongly actualize some state of affairs is to be the cause of that state. So, if God were to strongly actualize that human beings choose to do something, then God would be causing them to do it, and Plantinga believes that this is incompatible with freedom. Opponents of the free-will defence could still claim that if God had given us more incentive to choose right, just by turning right actions into actions of high pleasure, people would be then more inclined to choose what is right. Going back, Mackie’s argument can be stated in two propositions:

(1) God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good

(2) There is evil in the world.

Mackie believes that proposition (1) and (2) lead to the conclusion that God does not exist, or that the theist argument is inconsistent, or “Why could God not have made men such that they always freely choose the good?”[4] Plantinga thinks that the solution lies in the formulation of a third proposition:

(3) It is possible that God is omnipotent, and it was not within his power to create a world containing moral good and no moral evil.[5]

There are two important premises Plantinga uses to defend (3). One has already been mentioned above, namely that the concept of freedom is such that it is not logically possible for God to cause someone to choose always what is right and act freely at the same time. The second premise is about transworld depravity. Plantinga introduces the notion of transworld depravity when discussing a world in which a person named “Smedes” offers a bribe to Curley, who is free with respect to this bribe. This world (3) is such that if it were actual and Curley is offered the bribe, Curley freely accepts the bribe. Plantinga then writes[6]: God knows in advance what Curley would do if created and placed in these states of affairs. Now take any one of these states of affairs S. Perhaps what God knows is that if he creates Curley, causes him to be free with respect to A, and brings it about that S is actual, then Curley will go wrong with respect to A. But perhaps the same is true for any other state of affairs in which God might create Curley and give him significant freedom; that is, perhaps what God knows in advance is that no matter what circumstances he places Curley in, so long as he leaves him significantly free, he will take at least one wrong action. Plantinga continues and says, that if the story is true, then Curley suffers from transworld depravity. However, all Plantinga needs for his argument is that it is possible that everyone suffers from transworld depravity.[7] Consequently, it is possible that God is omnipotent and that it is not within God’s power to create free will and reduce evil, or reduce or increase good or evil in the world, because if God decided to we would stop acting freely. It would be like changing the weights on a side of a scale. The balance would be destroyed, and man would stop acting completely free. Even if we could act still partially free with God being able to stop of us from doing greater evil, we would not be acting completely freely or we would not even have a clue of whether we were acting freely or not. So if (3) shows that (1) and (2) are consistent, Plantinga has shown that the logical problem of evil has a solution. The universality of transworld depravity in the real world shows that God does not think logically impossible to effect a possible world free of such depravity.

Some scholars argue that Plantinga has rejected the idea of an omnipotent God in favor of an all benevolent God, as he claims that there are some things God cannot do – logically impossible things (i.e. evil). Plantinga, however, does not include the omnipotence of God the power to do the logically impossible. Plating reasons as follows. God can create a round square? Can he make 2 + 2 = 5? Can he make contradictory statements simultaneously true? In response to each of these questions, Plantinga’s answer is “No.” Each of the scenarios described in these issues is impossible: objects or events in question could not exist. Omnipotence, according to Plantinga, is the power to do anything logically possible. The fact that God cannot do the logically impossible is not real limitation of the power of God. Plantinga urges those uncomfortable with the idea of ​​limitations of the power of God to think carefully about the absurd implications of a God who can do the logically impossible. If you think God can make a round square, Plantinga wonders what resembles such a figure. If God can make 2 + 2 = 5, then 2 + 3 would be equal to what? Each of these things seems to be absolutely, positively impossible.

In response to this formulation of the problem of evil, Plantinga has shown that the charge of inconsistency was mistaken. The dissatisfaction that many felt with Plantinga’s solution, may be the product of a desire to see the free-will defence give a complete answer to the problem of evil. Some of the most important questions about God and suffering remain unanswered. The desire to see a response to the theistic problem of evil that goes beyond the mere deconstruction of an atheist argument in particular is understandable.My point may be in the form of a dilemma. If (3), covers creaturely essences or reality in “all” possible worlds, then (3) denies the logical possibility of worlds in which human and Curley are exempt from transworld depravity. Although Plantinga himself admits that such worlds (with less evil or no evil) are indeed logically possible. And since anything that is logically possible is necessarily possible, deny that such world would be like saying something necessarily false. And if the premise (3) is false (not to mention necessarily false) then the argument of Plantinga would be in bad situation. But if, on the other hand, the scope of “all” includes only the creaturely essences that exist in the real world, then (3) leaves open the possibility that God actualize a world populated by creatures such as the virtuoso Curley. But under any other atheistic interpretations on proposition (3), and Plantinga’s argument can still capsize. For example, atheists could say that God could have removed evil, simply by making right moral actions richer in pleasure and interest. By turning right moral actions into actions of high pleasure most of us would be more inclined to choose good rather than evil. But maybe even examples like this could be undermined by defenders of the free-will defence. Hicks for example argues that if good was always endowed with pleasure, good would lose its meaning. Easy, pleasurable are not to be confused with what is meant by good and virtue, and “if we attribute the latter and higher aim to God, we must decalre to be self-contradictory the idea that of God’s so creating men that they will inevitably respond positively to Him”[8]. God gave us freedom to have faith and obedience in Himself, and if things became easier this two aspects would disappear. Hick’s also argues that the existence of evil is necessary for our character development.

Even if Plantinga leaves no doubt that the theist argument is logically consistent, the atheist can still protest since (3) lies somewhat on how prepared we are to justify evil. Although the existence of evil and an all benevolent God is logically possible that does not undermine the fact that there is too much evil, even if this is the best of “all” possible worlds. They believe that while some evil may be necessary there is a disproportionate amount of it in our world. Not only there is too much of it but a great deal of it serves no purpose in the moral training of anyone. Besides disproportionate evil leads to the existence of even more evil. Societies that have more misery tend to be more violent and corrupt. A child raised by criminals will have more probability to choose evil, than a child raised by caring family. Sometimes I think that compassion could still be exercised without children being born disable, without people suffering from anger, etc. Brotherhood for example, can be achieved through a friendly work environment, through friendship, or just simply by enjoying good moments in life. We don’t make friends based solely on suffering, but rather because being with friends and experiencing good moments with them is good. The problem of pointless suffering also seems to be left out by theodicists like Hicks, when asked why so many young children suffer terribly without being given the chance to develop their characters. Much suffering of adults is simply overwhelming and provides no chance of character building. To make things worse, I am not sure that the free-will defence, provides a good response to the problem of evil not being equally shared, since some people tend to suffer more than others, independently of their actions. Finally, why is there so much natural evil and suffering of animals which seems to be entirely pointless and unjustifiable.

The theist free-will defence does not by itself explain why there are natural evils for which humans are not responsible.Swinburne has full awareness of the problem of “natural evil” and, in his work, we find a clear description of their nature “Natural evils includes both physical suffering and mental suffering, of animals and humans; all the trail of suffering which disease, natural disasters, and accidents unpredictable by humans bring in their train.”[9]. The paradigm of moral responsibility in the face of natural evil only has two possible answers: the first is to say that the “natural evil” is a necessary condition to exercise our sense of responsibility. Indeed, the presence of natural evil poses a very wide range of responses that can range from the cruel indifference to great works of charity. The second answer, perhaps more compelling, is the fact that natural evil makes our lives more meaningful in themselves by increased responsibility. My third answer lies on the creative side of natural disasters like volcano eruptions which are good to form new lands, which seems to be forgotten.

According to Swinburne, if our lives become more meaningful in themselves through solicitude and charity, that fact does not change the existence of natural evil as well, but it allows us to understand their rationale. To demonstrate this, the author constructs a thought experiment in which we can realize more clearly what is at issue with his notion of a “more meaningful life.” Swinburne says – “Suppose that you exist in another world before your birth in this one, and are given a choice as to the sort of life you are to have in this one. You are told that you are to have only a short life, maybe of only few minutes, although it will be an adult life in the sense that you will have the richness of sensation and belief characteristic of adults. You have a choice as to the sort of life you will have. You can have either a few minutes of very considerable pleasure, of the kind produced by some drug such as heroin, which you will experience by yourself and which will have no effects at all in this world (for example, no one else will know about it); or you can have a few minutes of considerable pain, such as the pain of childbirth, which will have (unknown to you at the time of pain) considerable good effects on others over a few years”[10]. You are told that, if you do not make the second choice, the others will never exist – and so you are under no moral obligation to make the second choice. But you seek to make the choice which will make your own life the best life for you to have led.”[11] In light of this thought experiment is credible to think that only the second choice makes our life meaningful, that is, with respect, not only to others but also to ourselves. The second choice is not only the only creative choice, but it is also the one that is grounded in a future perspective. This thought experiment patents, in our view, the strength and main weakness of the paradigm of moral responsibility in the face of “natural evil”: on one hand, makes us understand that pain, despite being, in itself, an evil, can give meaning to a life. On the other side, Levinas denounced this desire to engage in any justification of which, by their very nature, can never be justified under penalty of no longer having the same sense experience as an “evil”. It should be noted that one of the merits of the paradigm of moral responsibility was to show that theodicy is not absurd or inconsistent in logical terms.

As stressed by Alvin Plantinga, in his book God and other Minds, the paradox of theodicy only exists if the third proposition (“evil exists”) is reworded as follows: “If evil exists, it is unjustified (…) If there is any evil then there is unjustified evil”[12]. In a purely conceptual analysis, it is impossible to show that this proposition is a necessary truth. According to this argument, the burden of proof is again the critical theodicy, which must show that there is a certain kind of evil which in themselves, are, in all possible circumstances, unwarranted.

William Rowe

The problem of evil is not so much for the formal inconsistency between the existence of God and the existence of evil in general, but rather the contradiction derived from the existence of evil defined as free as so many evils could be avoided without putting at risk greater goods. Proper evil consists in the explanation that he singled offer a greater good or that prevented at least an even greater evil. In this critical context arises the famous example of a natural evil presented by William Rowe: imagine one creates a doe, abandoned to die in atrocious suffering a wildfire triggered by strictly natural causes and no one has knowledge time. According to Rowe, it is not plausible to perceive the biggest assets that could arise from this event.[13] The same could be for a human baby. However, if the purpose of the universe were to produce virtuous people, and all evil suffered in this world just temporary (at least for the good Christians and Muslims), then there is reason to think that we need to be quite a lot of evil, both natural and moral evil, so that we can develop the desired virtues. Plus, if we think we have an endless afterlife, all the suffering in this world seems quite insignificant. It is to say that the purpose of our existence in this life is to make us morally fit for a better one. This is sometimes referred to as the value of soul making defence.

However, that sense of optimality or lack of evidence persists, at least for the atheists or those against any justification for the presence of evil in face of the existence of an omnipotent, benevolent and omniscient God. Why is there so much pointless suffering? Many young children, suffer terribly without being given the chance to develop their characters. Much suffering of adults is simply overwhelming and provides no chance of character building.

Then there is the suffering of animals which seems to be entirely pointless and unjustifiable. Here Hicks also tries to give us a response to – Why does an all good and infinitely loving Creator permit the pain and carnage of animal life? Hick’s answer to the question about pain is that pain, in those creatures who suffer it, is “part of their equipment for survival”[14]. Animals benefit, as humans do, by possessing the equipment for survival and so it can be thought of as part of the plan of a benevolent god. As to the violence of nature, Hick argues that animals experience the world quite differently from humans, that death is not a problem for them as it is for us since they live their lives from moment to moment oblivious as to what may lie ahead for them. This aspect of the problem evaporates, he argues, once we see that it is a mistake to project the fears and anxieties we have about ourselves onto creatures who are incapable of feeling them. I must disagree with that. Most animal behaviorists have also diagnosed animals with depression and anxieties which sometimes are caused by human actions or simply by chemical imbalances in their brains.

There remains the problem of pain which does not serve its purpose, exceeds what is necessary to serve its purpose or continues long afterwards. Given that God is all-loving and omnipotent, there should not be such unnecessary pain at all. If humans can fear the events that are not imminent, animals cannot. We can also be confident in saying that some animals suffer terror as that they suffer physical pain. That is what offended Darwin about cats playing with mice. If the mouse was not in a state of terror this would not be a case of cruelty. I think Hick’s response unconvincing, that an animal “lives from instant to instant, either in healthy and presumably pleasurable activity, or in a pleasant state of torpor”[15]. Surely many animals struggle through their short lives in constant pain through illness or injury. Even if animal life is not “a dark ocean of agonizing fear and pain”[16], it is beset by much more agonizing fear and pain than Hick acknowledges.

In conclusion, even if it is not possible to demonstrate that belief in a wholly good and powerful God is inconsistent with the evil that there is in the world, someone’s experience of the world can change, as it did for Darwin. Even if the logical problem of evil can be resolved at least with some degree of satisfaction, there remains what we can call the empirical problem of evil. Darwin’s experiences as biologist led him to think that God is not benevolent, which goes against the principles of most monotheist religions. Darwin argued for rejecting belief in God’s benevolence rather than in his omnipotence: “I cannot see as plainly as others do, and as I should wish to do, evidence of design and beneficence on all sides of us. There seems to me too much misery in the world”[17]. David Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion alsoraises concern for the empirical problem of evil. The sceptic Philo perceives that there may be no inconsistency in believing in a wholly good and omnipotent God in the face of evil. He considers the hypothetical example of a creature who, before being brought into this world is already assured that the world was the workmanship of a perfectly benevolent being. Such a creature would be very disappointed with what he found in the world, but he would not need to retract his belief that it was the workmanship of a perfectly benevolent being. For he may reflect on the limitations of his own understanding and the possibility that the evils of the world might be seen in a better light through the eyes of a less limited being than himself. Philo claims that we “may be fully convinced of the narrows limits of his (our) understanding, but this will not help him in forming an inference concerning the goodness of superior powers, since he must form that inference from what he knows, not from what he is ignorant of.”[18] Even if belief in a good God cannot be shown to be inconsistent with the recognition of evil in the world, it is not belief that anyone could reasonably arrive at on the basis of their experience of the world alone. However, I contest that the problem of evil should be a matter of faith, because belief in a good God is something only to be believed and not as a generalization based on detached observation of the world. Therefore the empirical problem of evil is only a problem for atheists. Now beliefs are not knowledge, because whatever is true must be real.

Bibliography:

Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1974

Aquinas, T., Summa Theologica, Coyote Canyon Press (June 19, 2010)

Brown S., Philosophy of Religion – Introduction with Readings, (Routledge 2000)

Flew and A. MacIntyre “Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom, New Essays in Philosophical Theology”, (New York: Macmillan, 1955)

Hicks J., Evil and the God of Love, (Macmillian, 1978)

Hume, D., Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (University of Michigan Library, 2007

Mackie, J. L. “Freedom and Omnipotence.”, 1955 Mind 64

Plantinga A., God and Other Minds. A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God, (Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 1990

Plantinga, A., The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974)

Plantinga, A., The Problem of Evil (Oxford Readings in Philosophy, 1990)

Stump E., and Murray J. M., The Big Questions, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1999)

Warburton N., Philosophy: Basic Readings, (Routledge, 2005)

 [1] At Summa Theologica p. 48-9

[2] Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1974, p. 167.

[3] Cf. Flew’s “Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom,”I in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, ed. Flew and A. MacIntyre (New York: Macmillan, 1955); and Mackie’s “Evil and Omnipotence,” Mind, 64, 254 (April, 1955): 209.

[4] Mackie, J. L. “Freedom and Omnipotence.”, 1955 Mind 64 p.209

[5] Plantinga, A., The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 184

[6] Plantinga, A., The Problem of Evil (Oxford Readings in Philosophy, 1990), p.102

[7] Plantinga, A., The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 187-88

[8] Hick J., Evil and the God of Love, (Macmillan, 1978), p.310

[9] Warburton N., Philosophy: Basic Readings, (Routledge, 2005), p.70

[10] Warburton N., Philosophy: Basic Readings, (Routledge, 2005), p.78

[11] Ibid, p.78

[12] Plantinga A., God and Other Minds. A Study of the Rational Justification of Belief in God, (Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 126

[13] Stump E., and Murray J. M., The Big Questions, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1999), p.159-160.

[14] Hicks J., Evil and the God of Love, (Macmillian, 1978) p.311

[15] Ibid, p.350

[16] Ibid, p.350

[17] Brown S., Philosophy of Religion – Introduction with Readings, (Routledge 2000) p.92

[18] Hume, D., Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (University of Michigan Library, 2007), p. 114